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Abstract
This article seeks to understand a common and regular feature of asylum decision-
making, namely, that the majority of asylum claims are rejected, mostly on the basis
of non-credibility. It draws on a bottom-up, qualitative study of an administration in
which asylum decision-making takes place: the Swiss Secretariat for Migration. By
adopting a practice-theoretical approach to administrative work, it advocates paying
attention to caseworkers’ routinised, self-evident and largely unquestioned
behaviours, not only in terms of what they do, but also of what they think, feel and
know. Building on Bourdieu, it introduces the concept of institutional habitus, which
refers to the dispositions caseworkers develop on the job. On the basis of a specific
decision-making practice termed ‘digging deep’, the article shows how these
dispositions are structured and how, through the practices institutional habitus
generates, these ‘structuring structures’ are continuously reaffirmed, leading to the
relatively stable outcomes of administrative decision-making that can be observed
from the outside. The article argues against the assumption that regularities of
administrative work should be understood as the outcome of strict rule-following,
top-down orders and political instrumentalism. At the same time, it challenges the
individualist quality sometimes ascribed to discretionary practices in street-level
bureaucracy literature and in critiques of credibility assessment practices in asylum
adjudication.
Keywords: Administrative work, Asylum, Bureaucracy, Credibility, Discretion, Practice
theory, Institutional habitus, Organisational ethnography, Refugee status
determination, Switzerland
Introduction: Regularities of administrative practice
The first Asylum Act regulating the legal categorisation of so-called asylum seekers in
Switzerland was enacted in 1981. I use the word ‘so-called’ here because the term
asylum-seekers is one specific to the ‘individual protection regimes’ of the global North
which consider people to be ‘individual “asylum seekers” whose “well-founded fear of
persecution” has to be examined in a laborious administrative procedure before they
may become “refugees” legally’ (Poertner 2018, p. 5). This stands in contrast to the col-
lective protection regimes of the global South where ‘people are collectively regarded
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as “refugees” because they fled their countries of origin or residence’ (ibid.). Since the
early 1980s, the number of people applying for asylum in Switzerland has both in-
creased and fluctuated greatly, and there has been considerable variation as to which
countries most of the asylum seekers have been fleeing from (see Parak 2020).1 Yet,
there is a consistency. Recognition rates have remained low since 1983, when the rate
dropped from 74.9% to 48.6%, and have varied since then between 3.2% in 1991 and
31.2% in 2019.2 Furthermore, a trend that has been observed not only for Switzerland
but also for other countries of the global North is that the majority of asylum appli-
cants are rejected not because their claims do not fulfil refugee status requirements,
but rather because they are not perceived as being credible, which is a legal precondi-
tion for being recognised as a refugee (see Fassin 2013, p. 47; Kelly 2012, p. 759;
Tomkinson 2018, p. 186). This article seeks to understand such regularities in and of
administrative practice through a bottom-up, qualitative study of the organisation in
which administrative decision-making happens. It discusses and analyses the everyday
practices of caseworkers3 in the Swiss Secretariat for Migration (SEM), which is the state
administration in charge of taking first instance asylum decisions in Switzerland.
According to Max Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy, stability and ‘calculability of re-
sults’ are key characteristics of bureaucracy and of legal-rational authority (Weber 2013
[1978], p. 223).4 Weber’s abstract theorisation of bureaucracy suggests that such stabil-
ity is, at least in part, the result of rule-bound conduct (Weber 2013 [1978], p. 218).
Yet, as Weber’s concept of the ideal type itself implies, in practice, administrative work
functions differently, consisting of more than mechanical rule-following (see Lipsky
2010; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). Not only is not all administrative practice
guided by rules. Rules or law, whose ‘application’ lies at the heart of administrative
decision-making, must necessarily always be interpreted when being fitted with specific
situations or cases (see Eckert 2020, pp. 15–16; Eule et al. 2019, p. 101; Wagenaar
2004, p. 651). Hendrik Wagenaar calls these acts of interpreting rules and putting them
into practice discretion and thus gives the term a meaning that differs from how it is
commonly used in ‘classical’ street-level bureaucracy literature (Wagenaar 2020
p. 261). Michael Lipsky (2010, pp. 13–14) and Tony Evans (2010, p. 2), for
example, conceptualise discretion in terms of the power and individual freedom so-called
street-level bureaucrats have to make judgements and the way they selectively invoke
different rules or law when dealing with specific cases. Discretion is depicted as the
outcome of caseworkers’ relative freedom from supervision, allowing them to take actions
or decisions – within certain boundaries – that they personally see as fit. Whilst these au-
thors also recognise the necessity of discretion for making law and policy work, they
ascribe an individualist quality to what they perceive as this discretionary freedom (see
1See also: SEM. Asylstatistik. Archiv ab 1994. https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/de/home/publiservice/statistik/
asylstatistik/archiv.html. Accessed 10 September 2020.
2I thank Jonathan Miaz for sharing these numbers with me. The recognition rates refer only to the
percentage of asylum seekers that were legally recognised as refugees and granted asylum. They do not
include those people who received temporary protection on so-called humanitarian grounds.
3I use the term caseworkers to describe officials working in administrative organisations because the people
whose everyday practices I study assess and take decisions on individual claims. In dealing with these claims,
they engage in case-making (see Poertner 2018).
4The terms bureaucracy and bureaucrats carry negative connotations. They are often associated with red
tape and officialism and used as criticism (see Eckert 2020, p. 7; Poertner 2017, p. 12; Zacka 2017, pp. 1–3).
It is for this reasons that I employ the terms administration and caseworkers instead.
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Eckert 2020, pp. 10, 15–16). Hence, little or no attention is paid to how caseworkers’ views
of what they personally regard as fit, adequate, correct or appropriate are shaped by their
office, nor to how certain interpretations of the law become normalised, and thus become
the self-evident thing to do. This is, in contrast, precisely where my interest lies, for which
I draw on Hendrik Wagenaar’s conceptualisation of discretion.5
Wagenaar claims that ‘[m]ost administrators in a particular policy domain or govern-
ment bureaucracy operate in broadly similar ways’ (Wagenaar 2020, p. 260). He argues
that while such similarities can ‘partly [be] explained by the behavioural shaping by
organizational routines, standard operating procedures and software architecture, [ …]
[these] do not explain how the discretionary part of all these decentred administrative ac-
tions is shaped’ (ibid.). This article takes up Wagenaar’s point, asking how caseworkers’
everyday interpretations of rules are shaped and structured by the organisational, ideo-
logical and political environments the caseworkers work in, the practicalities of the job, as
well as the knowledge they acquire through their experience in the service, but also how
their everyday practices of interpreting and ‘applying’ rules are constitutive of those very
environments. It does so through a practice-theoretical approach to administrative work.
In recent years, several studies have addressed the issue of asylum decision-making
from a bottom-up perspective, studying different asylum administrations and courts
from the inside and providing insights into the everyday making of asylum decisions
(see Dahlvik 2018; Johannesson 2017; Jubany 2017; Liodden 2016; Miaz 2017; Poert-
ner 2018; Probst 2012; Scheffer 2001; Tomkinson 2018; and the edited volumes by
Gill and Good 2019 as well as Lahusen and Schneider 2017). With a few exceptions
that compare different national asylum administrations with each other (see Hamlin
2014; Probst 2012), the empirical focus of these studies lies on single national admin-
istrations (or courts) and their work. Read together, however, these ethnographic case
studies bring to light striking resemblances in how caseworkers go about doing their
job, despite differences in local contexts and organisational structures. In more or less
explicit ways, the above-mentioned studies – as well as those of scholars working on
administrations more generally – are concerned with the shaping of these everyday
practices. Together they bring numerous influencing factors to light: induction train-
ing and organisational socialisation; professional norms, values and role perceptions;
internal regulations and guidelines; structural constraints of ‘case-making’ and ‘fact-
finding’; pragmatic considerations; commitment towards ‘clients’; accountability to-
wards peers, intra- or supra-organisational authorities and the general public; and the
broader political environment in which the organisations are embedded (Alpes and
Spire 2014; Dahlvik 2018; Eule et al. 2019; Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012; Heyman 2004;
Johannesson 2017; Jubany 2017; Liodden 2016; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2012;
Miaz 2017; Poertner 2018; Scheffer 2001; Tomkinson 2018; Zacka 2017). Further-
more, several scholars have explored the impact caseworkers’ educational back-
ground, gender, professional experience and/or political ideology has on their
decision-making (see Anker 1992; Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012; Macklin 2009; Spirig
2018). By drawing on and engaging with these studies, the argument this article
makes is twofold. First, in line with several of the above-mentioned studies, I argue in
5For a detailed discussion of the term discretion, see Affolter 2021), Eule et al. (2019, pp. 84–90) and Liodden
(2016, pp. 68–76).
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favour of paying attention to the regularities in administrative work and to the differ-
ent factors giving rise to them instead of focussing on the divergencies in asylum
decision-making. Connected to this, I propose to focus more on the structuring and sta-
bilising factors working from within organisations than on caseworkers’ individual attri-
butes, in order to gain a critical understanding of asylum decision-making (see also
Tomkinson 2018). Second, building on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, I develop the concept
of institutional habitus as a conceptual tool for analysing the structuring of discretionary
practices. I conceptualise institutional habitus as the dispositions to think, act and feel in
specific ways that caseworkers develop on the job (see Affolter 2021).
As Hendrik Wagenaar argues, ‘organizational routines, standard operating procedures
and software architecture’ are not enough to ‘explain how the discretionary part of [ …] ad-
ministrative actions is shaped’ (Wagenaar 2020, p. 260). The concept of the institutional
habitus helps to address this ‘problem’ in that it not only allows us to bring together the dif-
ferent structuring factors that scholars have identified, but also in that it draws attention to
how everyday practices structure their environments. Or, in other words, practices are not
only constituted by their environments, they are also constitutive of them. Furthermore, the
institutional habitus acknowledges knowledge in its different forms – implicit (or tacit), ex-
plicit, motivational, bodily and emotional – as a crucial part of what practice and, therefore,
administrative work is. Thus, as I show in this article, only by analysing what this knowledge
consists of and how it is acquired, passed on and reproduced can we gain an understanding
of how caseworkers’ discretionary practices – their everyday acts of interpreting law when
fitting it with specific cases or situations – are shaped and structured.
The remaining sections of this article are structured as follows. I start by describing
how administrative work can be conceptualised from a practice theoretical perspective
and why this is useful for understanding asylum decision-making in the SEM and then
introduce readers to the concept of the institutional habitus. The second part gives a
short outline of how refugee status determination in Switzerland works and how I stud-
ied these processes in the SEM. It discusses the role of ‘talk’ when studying administra-
tive work from a practice theoretical perspective. The third part analyses a specific
practice which I call ‘digging deep’. It maps out structural factors that shape digging
deep and shows how disbelief becomes institutionalised and reproduced through this
very practice. In the conclusion, these findings are discussed against the backdrop of
the institutional habitus.
Asylum decision-making as practice and the institutional habitus
In conceptualising administrative work as practice, I draw on Andreas Reckwitz (2002,
2003), Hendrik Wagenaar (2004) and Julia Dahlvik (2018). A ‘practice’, according to An-
dreas Reckwitz, ‘is a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, in-
terconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’
and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states
of emotion and motivational knowledge’ (Reckwitz (2002, p. 249). Understanding admin-
istrative decision-making as practice thus means recognising such everyday actions as an
assemblage of all these different elements. Not only bodily activities matter – which in
the case of administrative work mainly consist of activities such as writing, reading and
talking. Different forms of knowledge, including implicit or tacit knowledge which refers
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to the things we simply know or can do without being able to say how and why, also con-
stitute an important part of practice (see Dahlvik 2018, p. 57; Reckwitz 2003, p. 290).
The relevance of such implicit or tacit knowledge became immediately apparent
when I observed how caseworkers do credibility assessments in the SEM and talked to
them about the process. When I asked SEM caseworkers, in a rather abstract way, how
they knew whether something was credible or not, they often referred to their ‘gut feel-
ing’. For example, Andrea,6 a fairly experienced caseworker in the SEM, said to me: ‘It’s
more like a feeling. And then I look for it in the text’. What she meant was that cred-
ibility assessment usually starts with an intuition about whether the asylum seeker’s
story is true or not. This initial intuition – caseworkers’ implicit or tacit knowledge –
then crucially guides their subsequent actions: how thoroughly they question applicants
in the asylum interviews and what kind of arguments they look for in the minutes of
the interview to reason their final written decisions.
Even if caseworkers themselves regularly referred to such ‘feelings’ or ‘intuitions’ as
being ‘subjective’, I soon noted during fieldwork that caseworkers frequently concurred
with each other in their impressions regarding the ‘authenticity’ of asylum claims, while
for me – the outsider with no professional experience in the office – this was often
much less clear. This impression was reaffirmed by my observation that caseworkers’
credibility assessments are rarely checked by their superiors. When asked about this,
the superiors explained to me that this had to do with them knowing how their experi-
enced employees worked and trusting them to be able to take the right credibility deci-
sions. One superior, Nora, said to me:
All these terms [like ‘plausible’, ‘comprehensible’, ‘logical’ and ‘realistic’ for example]
are used [for reasoning positive decisions]. For me that is ok. […] I mean, if someone
uses a word like that who only started [working here] three months ago, I might ask:
‘Hey, what does that mean for you?’ But if [the decision] comes from someone whom I
consider to be a valuable, serious, good employee, then I’ll allow it, because I know, I
can imagine what it means for them.7
Nora’s statement indicates that she shares an understanding with her experienced
employees of what it means for an asylum seeker’s story to be ‘realistic’, for example.
For her, this means that there is no need to check the arguments of the written deci-
sion against the minutes of the asylum interview or to thoroughly study the minutes in
order to evaluate how the interview was conducted. She trusts her experienced em-
ployees to do those things the right way. What makes Nora (and her fellow superiors)
trust their experienced employees is that they have been sufficiently socialised by the
office, which allows them to think and act in ways which are familiar to the heads and
with which they agree. With new caseworkers, in turn, they see it as their duty to form
the newcomers accordingly. Trust, therefore, depends on the institutional habitus case-
workers acquire.
This indicates that while habitus operates from within individuals, it is not strictly in-
dividual. Or, as Pierre Bourdieu argues, ‘[h]abitus is socialized subjectivity’ (Bourdieu
and Wacquant 1992, p. 126). Conceptualising decision-making practices as ‘socialized
subjectivity’ thus allows us to overcome the individualistic quality often associated with
6All the names I use in this article are pseudonyms.
7Nora, head of asylum division, interview transcript, my own translation.
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tacit knowledge, implicit know-how and personal feelings. This kind of ‘individualist
bent’ (Eckert 2020, pp. 9–10) can be found in ‘classical’ street-level bureaucracy litera-
ture, as mentioned above, as well as in several critical studies of credibility determin-
ation in asylum procedures – conducted mainly by legal scholars – which criticise the
so-called ‘subjectivity’ or even ‘arbitrariness’ of credibility assessments (see, for instance,
Kagan 2003; Macklin 1998; Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009). Michael Kagan, for example,
claims that ‘subjective assessments are highly personal to the caseworker, dependent on
personal judgement, perceptions and dispositions, and often lacking an articulated
logic’ (Kagan 2003, p. 374). His critique is that these assessments are ‘very difficult to
review and are likely to be inconsistent from one decision-maker to another’ (ibid.).
While I agree with him that such assessments are ‘personal judgements’ which are
based on caseworkers’ dispositions, the point I make is that we cannot leave it at that,
but must explore what these dispositions consist of, how they are acquired and how,
through the practices they generate, they reproduce the conditions of their own exist-
ence. Hence, in the end these dispositions are less ‘personal’ than they may seem. I also
do not challenge his assertion that there are inconsistencies (or, rather, divergencies) in
decision-making. Research has shown that the outcomes of decision-making may differ
between individual caseworkers (or judges) as well as different organisational units and
administrations (see Anker 1992; Eule 2014; Fassin and Kobelinsky 2012; Hamlin 2014;
Ramji-Nogales et al. 2009; Spirig 2018). Yet, I argue that these divergences should not
be overestimated and that we must be careful not to lose sight of the regularities and
commonalities that nonetheless exist, for instance, the fact that the majority of asylum
applications are rejected on the grounds of non-credibility, even by those caseworkers
considered the most ‘lenient’. Rejecting the assumption that administrative practices
are highly individualistic does not mean that habitus works in a deterministic way
(Hitchings 2012, p. 62). To the contrary, habitus is creative and inventive and can pro-
duce ‘an infinite number of practices’ (Bourdieu 1990, p. 55). However, the practices a
habitus generates will necessarily fall within ‘the limits of its structures’ (Wacquant
1992, p. 19) and thus produce the relatively stable outcomes of administrative work that
can be observed from the outside.
For Bourdieu, the dispositions which constitute a habitus are shared by people be-
longing to the same social class or social collective. With the institutional habitus, in
turn, the focus is on the dispositions that emerge from and through organisational so-
cialisation, the experiences members of an organisation make on the job, and their daily
interactions with each other and their ‘clients’, rather than on caseworkers’ social back-
ground. This is not to say that their background does not have an influence on their
everyday practices. Instead, the argument I make is that caseworkers’ social back-
grounds alone are not enough to explain what they think, feel, know and do, and, thus,
ultimately, to understand the work of organisations. To gain such an understanding, we
must study the professional values, routines and knowledge that caseworkers pick up
and come to incorporate into their work through their socialisation within the organ-
isation. At the same time, the similarities different bottom-up studies of asylum admin-
istrations bring to light suggest that legal-administrative decision-making and refugee
status determination as forms of ‘social institutions’ – understood in an abstract sense
as a complex of norms, values, rules, roles, conventions and cultural-cognitive schemes
(see Lang, Pott and Shinozaki, this volume; Miller 2019) – are constitutive of a habitus
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that can be observed not only in individual organisations. This is why I propose the
term institutional habitus instead of organisational habitus.8 Nevertheless, specific orga-
nisations as field sites matter: they are the places in which such institutions converge
and in which actors negotiate their environments (Wagenaar 2004, p. 648). Organisa-
tional structures, such as the ways in which induction training is organised or internal
chains of accountability, shape caseworkers’ institutional habitus.
Studying exclusion and inclusion from within the organisation
‘There is no bureaucracy without classification, without the invention of categories of inclu-
sion and exclusion’, Don Handelman writes (1995, p. 280). This also applies to the SEM and
asylum administrations more generally. In the SEM, caseworkers must assign asylum seekers
to one of four legal categories: refugee with asylum, refugee with temporary admission, non-
refugee with temporary admission and non-refugee without temporary admission. For making
this categorisation, the two questions decision-makers must answer are: Are the applicant’s
claims credible, and are the criteria for refugee status fulfilled? Refugees, according to Article
3 of the Swiss Asylum Act (AsylA),9 are defined as ‘persons who in their native country or in
their country of last residence are subject to serious disadvantages or have a well-founded fear
of being exposed to such disadvantages for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or due to their political opinion’ (Art. 3, paragraph 1, AsylA). In
order to be recognised as a refugee, asylum seekers have to ‘prove or at least credibly demon-
strate their refugee status’ (Art. 7, paragraph 1, AsylA). Article 7 of the Asylum Act further
stipulates that one’s ‘[r]efugee status is credibly demonstrated if the authority regards it as
proven on the balance of probabilities [and that] [c]ases are not credible in particular if they
are unfounded in essential points or are inherently contradictory, do not correspond to the
facts or are substantially based on forged or falsified evidence’ (Art. 7, paragraphs 2 and 3,
AsylA). In practice, since material evidence for corroborating reasons for having fled often
does not exist, credibility assessments are largely based on the applicants’ statements as they
were recorded in writing during the asylum interviews. It is then up to the decision-makers to
interpret for each specific case what it means for the narrative to be sufficiently founded or in-
herently contradictory, for example. Normally, asylum seekers are interviewed twice in the
course of the proceedings. The caseworker who carries out the second, longer asylum inter-
view usually takes the decision.10
Studies that research ‘practice’ have generated considerable debate as to whether ob-
serving ‘talk’ yields an adequate basis for grasping ‘practice’. Some authors have argued
that it is not, since many of the things we do are partially non-linguistic (see Halkier
8Similar concepts to that of the institutional habitus have also been used by Didier Fassin as well as Maybritt
Jill Alpes and Alexis Spire. The term Didier Fassin briefly refers to in his introduction to At the Heart of the
State is that of the professional habitus. He argues that officials’ ‘principles of justice [and] or order’ as well as
‘the values of the common good and public service’ are the products of officials’ professional habitus (Fassin
2015, p. 6). For Maybritt Jill Alpes and Alexis Spire, what they call the bureaucratic habitus ‘significantly
shapes […] [caseworkers’] interpretations of the legal frameworks’ and consists of the ‘set of norms shared by
other agents involved in migration control’ (Alpes and Spire 2014, p. 263).
9Asylum Act (AsylA) of 26 June 1998 (Status as of 1 April 2020). https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/19995092/index.html. Accessed 30 September 2020.
10What I describe here are the procedures in Switzerland as they were applied before the introduction of the
new accelerated asylum process on 1 March 2019. While this last reform has led to significant changes in the
administration’s organisational structure and some procedural aspects have changed, the core of SEM
caseworkers’ work has not. They still conduct asylum interviews and assess asylum seekers’ eligibility to
refugee status as well as their credibility, which is what this article is about.
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and Jensen 2011; Martens 2012). At the same time, authors like Russel Hitchings
(2012) hold that we should not underestimate the things that can be verbalised and
what we can learn from talking to our interaction partners. As human beings, we are
able to reflect on the things we do and to some extent also on the things that make us
do what we do. Therefore, talking to people during fieldwork can be useful for learning
about such reflections. Drawing on both these positions, I made use of method triangu-
lation, combining participant observation with interviews and document analysis. Be-
yond providing us with insights into caseworkers’ own reflections, I find ‘talk’ useful in
that it points us to the limits of what can be verbalised, indicating the moments in
which implicit knowledge comes to bear. The following statement made by a SEM
caseworker illustrates this:
Well, I have to say, in interviews you realise quickly if it’s credible or not, if a person
has experienced something or not. Um, it’s difficult to put into words. […] [T]he narra-
tive is just different from a person’s who is lying.11
In addition, as Steven Maynard-Moody and Musheno have argued, ‘talk’ in the form of story
narratives is useful for gaining an understanding of the ‘normative reasoning and context’ that
shapes administrative work, since ‘[t]hrough narratives, storytellers reveal more than they con-
sciously know’ (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2012, p. 21). Consequently, during fieldwork I
made sure to always ask my interaction partners for specific examples. Often, however, this
was not even necessary, with stories automatically finding their way into our conversations.
I conducted fieldwork in the SEM during various stays between 2013 and 2015. A
major part of this field research consisted of accompanying caseworkers from four dif-
ferent asylum divisions in their daily work, observing and asking them about what they
were doing, listening to their explanations and occasionally also actively joining in their
activities (see McDonald 2005; Mugler 2019, p. 54). I attended asylum interviews, pre-
pared these interviews with the caseworkers and discussed ‘cases’12 with them before and
after the interviews. Furthermore, by sitting in their offices, I observed caseworkers carry
out tasks such as writing decisions or giving advice to co-workers. A few times, I was also
able to accompany the heads of asylum divisions during their daily routines. On those
days, I observed superiors assign new asylum ‘cases’ to their employees and check the lat-
ter’s decisions, and I was able to accompany them to different meetings. Furthermore,
many people kept stopping by the heads’ offices to discuss specific issues, allowing me to
observe their interactions. Particularly fruitful moments of fieldwork were also the morn-
ing coffee breaks that the staff of an asylum division tended to take together. Finally, I was
able to take part in the three-week training course for new asylum caseworkers in the
SEM. All these moments of (participant) observations were complemented by interviews
which I conducted with twenty-seven caseworkers from nine different asylum divisions
and document analysis, mainly of induction training materials, different documents given
to me by caseworkers and of seventy-two case files.
‘Digging deep’: regularised disbelief and its everyday (re-)production
The fact that most asylum claims end up being rejected on the basis of non-credibility
has to do with a routinised practice which I call ‘digging deep’ (see Affolter 2020,
11Ralph, caseworker, interview transcript, my own translation.
12‘Cases’ is an emic term. Of course, what SEM caseworkers really deal with are not cases but people whose
lives are greatly affected by their practices and decisions.
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2021). Digging deep refers to the practice whereby decision-makers interrogate asylum
seekers during asylum interviews in a way that is aimed at ‘discovering’ indicators of
so-called non-credibility. Hence, decision-makers ask as many questions in asylum in-
terviews and undertake as many extra investigations as they feel are needed until they
have enough arguments for rejecting a claim or they are convinced that a story is true
‘after all’. This practice is not only characteristic of the SEM, but has also been de-
scribed for other asylum administrations (see Bohmer and Shuman 2008, p. 136; Jubany
2017, pp. 137, 135; Kelly 2012, p. 765). Caseworkers themselves ‘merely’ call this practice
testing credibility. What is crucial about this practice is that, as Thomas Scheffer’s (2001)
detailed analysis shows, through the questioning techniques used in digging deep, the so-
called ‘lies’, ‘liars’ and elements of non-credibility are not only passively discovered, but
are actively generated. The following example from my fieldwork illustrates this.
The ‘case’ concerns an asylum applicant from Eritrea who is being interviewed by a
caseworker called Bernard. As is common, Bernard, started the part about the appli-
cant’s reasons for applying for asylum with an open question: ‘Ok, so now you can
freely tell me about what happened to you personally in Eritrea and why you left
Eritrea’.13 In his narrative, the asylum seeker recounted the following event: ‘Two or
three armed people came to my home. They asked me questions. They insulted me ver-
bally. Then they beat me. I don’t remember what happened after that [ … ]. They left
us alone for roughly 20 days to a month. [ …] The soldiers then searched our house’.14
After that, Bernard began asking the asylum seeker ‘yes or no’ and ‘wh- questions’15:
Q: To confirm, just a quick question: If I’ve understood you correctly, the authorities
came to your house twice. The first time you were interrogated and beat and the sec-
ond time your house was searched. Is that correct?
A: Yes. They knew I had contact with [person A]. The government has spies
everywhere.
Q: How much time passed in-between these two events, roughly?
A: A short time; about two or three days. They really wanted to know what [person
A] had said to me.
Q: Can you name the date your house was searched and you left [your home
town]?16
At the end of the interview, Bernard confronted the applicant with contradictions.
This again is standard and also a formal administrative requirement, since it counts as
granting applicants the right to be heard (rechtliches Gehör gewähren).
Q: You said today that you were left alone for about 20 days after the first interroga-
tion by the authorities. Later you said that two or three days passed between the two
interrogations. Which one is true?
A: It was two or three days. If last time I said 20 days I was referring to the time span
before I left [my home town]. There were so many problems. That’s why I can’t re-
member everything too clearly.17
13Minutes of second asylum interview, field document, my own translation.
14Minutes of second asylum interview, field document, my own translation.
15‘Wh- questions usually start with a word beginning with wh-, but ‘how’ is also included. The wh- words
are: what, when, where, who, whom, which, whose, why, and how’ (Cambridge Dictionary. Wh-question.
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/wh-question. Accessed 23 September 2020).
16Minutes of second asylum interview, field document, my own translation.
17Minutes of second asylum interview, field document, my own translation.
Affolter Comparative Migration Studies             (2021) 9:4 Page 9 of 16
The example shows how through his questioning technique, Bernard created a possi-
bility for comparison, in this case between the statements made by the applicant at dif-
ferent moments during the asylum interview. This is a typical component of digging
deep. By asking the same question at multiple times during the asylum procedure or
even during a single interview, caseworkers seek to draw comparisons between asylum
seekers’ recorded statements from the first asylum interview and those from the second
interview, between different statements from one and the same interview or between
statements made by spouses or siblings who are questioned separately (see also Dahlvik
2018, p. 144; Scheffer 2001, pp. 160–165). In this case, by doing so, Bernard succeeded
in creating a contradiction that – through linking it with the non-credibility criterion
‘inherent contradictions’ from article 7 of the Swiss Asylum Act – he used as a reason
to reject the asylum claim. In his decision, he wrote:
Whilst in your free narrative you said that about 20 days to a month passed between the
first time the authorities came to your house and the time the military searched your
house (see file A9, p. 8), you later said that only two to three days had passed between the
questioning by the authorities and the searching of the house (see file A9, p. 22).18
Bernard, therefore, used the applicant’s recorded statements from the minutes of the
interview as an ‘on-file fact’ to reason and legitimise his decision.
Apart from searching for contradictions in this way, another strategy of digging deep
is to test the so-called ‘substance’ of asylum narratives. What this means is that case-
workers try to find out whether asylum seekers can speak in a detailed manner about
‘events’ relevant for asylum, which is regarded as an important indicator of credibility.
They do so by requesting things such as: ‘Please tell me in detail about the daily routine
in prison’.19 Furthermore, caseworkers try to generate answers that they can then com-
pare with ‘facts’ they can look up, for instance, by asking questions like ‘What was the
name of your church that was bombed?’20 Many caseworkers told me that while inter-
viewing asylum seekers, they always had the written decision in mind and kept ques-
tioning the applicant until they either had enough arguments to reject the case or were
convinced that the story was credible. In recognising credible accounts, caseworkers
(implicit) professional knowledge plays an essential role. Hence, caseworkers described
‘credible accounts’ to me as those which ‘just came pouring out’. All one therefore had
to do was to ‘lean back and listen to them talk’.21 This (implicit) professional know-
ledge guides whether and how deeply caseworkers will dig in individual ‘cases’ and may
also set the bar for specific groups of asylum seekers to fulfil this particular credibility
requirement differently.
Digging deep was not something I only observed experienced caseworkers do. New-
comers do it too, albeit in a more prepared way with the help of lists they have created
beforehand on the basis of the documents from the asylum seeker’s casefile. Therefore,
the questions we must ask are, on the one hand, how digging deep becomes a profes-
sional necessity, making newcomers more or less do it right from the start, and, on the
other, how it becomes a normalised, routinised practice.
18Asylum decision, field document, my own translation.
19Minutes of second asylum interview, field document, my own translation.
20Minutes of second asylum interview, field document, my own translation.
21Daniel, caseworker, interview transcript, my own translation.
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In the three-week training modules for new asylum caseworkers, the trainees were re-
peatedly told that it was their duty to thoroughly test the credibility of asylum claims.
They were taught the three-step questioning strategy that Bernard used for doing so.
The idea is to start with open questions, then go on to ask ‘wh-questions’ and, finally,
to ask ‘yes or no questions’ if necessary. The open questions at the beginning are
intended to give asylum seekers the opportunity to tell their stories. At the same time,
several caseworkers told me that this strategy of starting with an open question was
useful because in their ‘free narrative’ (freien Erzählung) asylum seekers tended to get
tangled up in contradictions (see also Jubany 2017, p. 136; Poertner 2018, pp. 161–
162). In terms of credibility testing, the ‘wh-questions’ then serve the purpose of creat-
ing possibilities for comparison and testing ‘substance’, whilst the ‘yes or no questions’
aim to establish clear-cut ‘facts’.
Novices not only learn this questioning strategy in theory; they also practice it with
their individual coaches who are usually experienced caseworkers working in the same
organisational unit. Teresa’s statement when talking about her role as a coach, illus-
trates this:
New [officials] often don’t work with the criterion of ‘contradicts an inner logic’ [for rea-
soning credibility decisions]. To give you an example: In one case, an applicant said that his
father had asked him to deliver letters to another person. And he didn’t just do that once,
but more like four to five times a week for about half a year. Now the [new] decision-maker
did not think to ask the applicant what was in those letters, so when we were preparing the
interview together I told her she had to ask him that. When she did, the applicant said that
he had never asked his father that out of respect. And that is just not logical. If I were your
father and I gave you a letter to take to someone nearly every day, you would ask me, even
if you respected [me]. You would say: ‘Of course I’ll take the letter, father, but what are
those letters you’re asking me to deliver’. That’s the obvious thing to do. Now, say the appli-
cant had asked his father and the father had said: ‘That’s none of your business’, that would
have been relatively plausible. But that he didn’t even ask his father is just not logical. And
that’s a strong argument [for the decision]. So that’s what I mean when I say that [new case-
workers] need to learn to ask good and suitable questions.22
The example shows how Teresa is teaching the novice to be sufficiently suspicious and
alert towards indicators that there might be something ‘off’ about the story and how she is
conveying a clear idea of what merits suspicion and what assumptions are deemed com-
mon sense when defining behaviour as ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ or ‘logical’ and ‘illogical’.
The novice is taught that this particular common-sense assumption (that it is illogical to
not ask about the letters) will make for a strong argument, but that coming up with such
arguments is dependent upon the questions she asks. She is taught to dig deep.
Upon joining the office, newcomers are generally attributed a naivety that they first
have to grow out of in order to not believe asylum seekers ‘too readily’. Hence, akin to
what has been described for other asylum administrations as well as administrations
more generally where people apply for goods and make rights claims on the state (see
Alpes and Spire 2014, p. 269; Borrelli et al.: States of suspicion: How institutionalised
disbelief shapes migration control regimes, forthcoming; Lavanchy 2014), I observed
that sufficient – but not overt – suspicion was considered an important professional
22Teresa, caseworker, interview transcript, my own translation.
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norm in the SEM. This norm is, on the one hand, linked to administrative caseworker’s
role as ‘gate-keepers’ (Lipsky 2010, p. 4) or ‘guardians of a restricted good’ (Heyman
2009, p. 381), which in the case of decision-making in the SEM is the right to reside in
Switzerland. On the other hand, the specific political and ideological context in which
asylum decision-making takes place, further fuels this professional norm.
Since the 1980s, Swiss asylum policies have become increasingly restrictive (see Miaz 2017;
Piguet 2006). Like in other countries of the global North, the ‘fight against abuse’ is high on
the political agenda, accompanied by a widespread discourse on so-called ‘bogus refugees’ (see
Zimmermann 2011). Asylum seekers and migrants in general are often portrayed as a ‘prob-
lem’ in political discourse and media and are seen as a ‘threat’ to states’ economy, culture and
identity (see Dahlvik 2018, p. 9; Gill and Good 2019, pp. 5–6; Miaz 2017, pp. 11–12). Today,
asylum determination procedures in the global North are thus structured around a ‘politics of
deterrence’ (Poertner 2017), with no country wanting to be more generous in granting asylum
and subsidiary protection than others, in order to avoid creating a so-called ‘pull-effect’ (see
Jubany 2017, p. 62; Liodden 2016, p. 219; Miaz 2017, pp. 15, 343; Poertner 2017, pp. 17, 283).
Exploring the full complexity how asylum decision-making practice is shaped by this poli-
tical and ideological context goes beyond the scope of this article. However, the point I want
to make here is that, rather than this political influence working in ‘direct’ ways – in the
sense that it plays out through explicit top-down orders or through caseworkers personally
sharing this political opinion (many explicitly do not) –, it more indirectly shapes case-
workers’ understanding of what it means to work in the name of the state. In this sense, ful-
filling Switzerland’s duties under international law and maintaining its self-ascribed image
as a humanitarian country, on the one hand, and securing Switzerland’s ‘borders’ by restrict-
ing non-citizens’ access to rights and goods as well as protecting the Swiss asylum system
from so-called ‘abuse’, on the other, become important institutional aims. In a seemingly
paradox way, both these ‘aims’ translate into an exclusionary logic of asylum. Hence, as
Didier Fassin and Carolina Kobelinsky have shown for the French asylum system, ‘[t] he less
frequently [asylum] is granted, the more precious refugee status becomes’ (Fassin and
Kobelinsky 2012, p. 464). It is through this lens that we must understand Gabriel when he
explained to me that it was the caseworkers’ duty to meticulously examine the credibility of
each case because otherwise ‘everybody could just receive asylum and that would be unfair
to those who really deserve asylum, who really need protection’.23 In this way, exclusion be-
comes normalised.
Finally, the emotional burden asylum decision-making poses for caseworkers as well
as pragmatic considerations also encourage digging deep. What I mean by this is that it
is often easier for caseworkers to reason negative decisions on the basis of non-
credibility than on the basis of non-eligibility for refugee status, because they feel more
secure about such decisions. Samuel’s statement exemplifies this:
Testing credibility is especially important if they [the asylum seekers] come from states
that act in an arbitrary manner [willkürliche Staaten]. […] Or broadly speaking, the worse
the situation in a country, the more we have to focus on the credibility of the claim, or the
more we tend to argue on the basis of credibility. I guess we have to. Because in such coun-
tries even a minor political activity can quickly result in the person being persecuted.24
23Gabriel, caseworker, interview transcript, my own translation.
24Samuel, caseworker, interview transcript, my own translation.
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Samuel insinuates that, as an asylum caseworker, one often has no way of knowing
whether an applicant might be in danger of future persecution in their ‘country of ori-
gin’ or not –in some countries, anything could potentially lead to a person being perse-
cuted. However, the practices described in this article are perceived by caseworkers as a
way of ascertaining with sufficient accuracy whether an asylum seeker’s claims are cred-
ible or not. Similarly, Patricia told me that it sometimes felt very cynical to her to say
to someone, for example: ‘You have no reason to be afraid’ of going back to Syria. She
felt, in contrast, that pointing out the contradictions in asylum seekers’ statements and
raising doubts about an entire story was easier.25 Rejecting asylum seekers on the basis
of non-credibility is, therefore, not only easier because such decisions can be reasoned
with more certainty. By rejecting claims on the basis of non-credibility, the emotional
burden of taking such life-changing decisions is lessened. The responsibility for the
outcome of the decision is shifted to the asylum seekers; it is their fault for not telling
‘the truth’. Or as Helen said: ‘I can also tell you why [I prefer arguing negative decisions
on the basis of non-credibility]. It’s for my conscience. If someone tells you rubbish
[dir einen Stuss erzählt], then you don’t have such a guilty conscience’.26
Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to address regularities in asylum decision-making using
a bottom-up, organisational approach. Studying such regularities entails investigating
the shaping and structuring of caseworkers’ interpretations of rules and law when ‘ap-
plying’ them to specific ‘cases’. At the core of this article were caseworkers’ interpreta-
tions of Article 7 from the Swiss Asylum Act or, in other words, how they assess the
credibility of asylum claims. As I have shown, administrative practice can only be
understood by taking into account the many different elements which constitute it:
what caseworkers do (for example, the questioning techniques they use and the ques-
tions they ask); what they know (for instance, the gut feelings which guide their cred-
ibility assessment or their knowledge as to how to successfully reason decisions); and
what they think and feel (for instance, the perceived necessity for and adequateness of
digging deep or the emotional burden asylum decision-making poses for caseworkers).
All this makes the institutional habitus a useful concept for grasping administrative
practice in its complexity. Furthermore, the institutional habitus considers structuring
factors, such as the formal requirements of legal-administrative decision-making as well
as the political, organisational and ideological environments in which the latter takes
place. But the institutional habitus is not only a system of ‘structured structures’; the
practices it generates also work as ‘structuring structures’ (see Bourdieu 1990, p. 53).
Digging deep is an example of this.
Through digging deep, caseworkers create the ‘on-file facts’ needed to reason negative
decisions. In doing so, the figure of the ‘bogus refugee’ is continuously reproduced.
Once asylum seekers have been classified as ‘bogus refugees’ by assigning them to the
legal category of ‘non-refugee’, their existence becomes a fact, reinforcing the percep-
tion that, indeed, there ‘are’ many ‘bogus refugees’, which, in turn, intensifies the of-
fice’s and individual caseworkers’ efforts to identify and exclude them from asylum (see
25Patricia, caseworker, interview transcript, my own translation.
26Helen, caseworker, interview transcript, my own translation.
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also Zimmermann 2011, p. 337). At the same time, if decision-makers reach the con-
clusion after digging deep (or due to their ‘gut feeling’) that there are no (or not
enough) reasons for disbelieving an applicant, a certain image of the ‘genuine refugee’
is (re-)produced. Consequently, the practice of digging deep constructs the conditions
that lie at its very basis.
Digging deep, in the particular way described in this article, seems to be specific to
asylum administrations and decision-making. And some aspects may even be specific
to the SEM, depending on the formal requirements for reasoning asylum decisions or
on how caseworkers are trained within the organisation, for example. Moreover, al-
though I did not systematically study these aspects, my research suggests that different
organisational units within the SEM and also individual caseworkers differ with regard
to how meticulously they dig deep. My interaction partners were prone to point this
out to me during fieldwork, frequently criticising their fellow caseworkers (mostly from
other organisational units) as being either too ‘soft’ or too ‘hard-line’ (see also Miaz
2017, pp. 374–375). However, unlike research which focuses precisely on such diver-
gencies, the aim of this article has been to look beyond them – not to deny that they
exist, but to shed light on the mundane ‘normalities’ of decision-making, in other
words, on the unquestioned middle ground between different ‘extreme positions’. In-
between ‘cynical’ or ‘hardline’ decision-making and ‘soft’, ‘lazy’ (in the sense of not dig-
ging deep enough) or ‘naïve’ decision-making, which are considered unprofessional,
there are the largely unquestioned modes of decision-making that are marked by con-
siderable suspicion and that are commonly accepted as professional. This does not
mean that all caseworkers consciously consider themselves or even feel that they have
to be suspicious. Rather, this middle ground manifests itself in the way in which digging
deep is accepted as the self-evident and normal thing to do, even if the intensity of the
process may be a matter of contestation. In other words, digging deep is considered as
the epitome of professional, neutral and objective decision-making (see Affolter 2020).
By focusing exclusively on stabilising structures and practices, for the reasons out-
lined above, this article leaves its own blind spot, namely the transformative capacity
that is also inherent in the institutional habitus. Researching how dispositions which
structure everyday practice change over time and also how caseworkers, through their
everyday practice, challenge certain structuring structures, should be at the core of fu-
ture research.
Beyond asylum administrations, a practice-theoretical approach with its consideration
of ‘the almost unthinking actions, tacit knowledge, fleeting interactions, practical judge-
ments, self-evident understanding and background knowledge, shared meanings, and
personal feelings’ (Wagenaar 2004, p. 643) would seem to be useful for investigating all
settings of administrative work. Furthermore, thanks to its focus on structuring struc-
tures, the institutional habitus constitutes a useful tool for cross-organisational com-
parison, allowing researchers to distinguish organisation-specific influences from those
that more broadly shape administrative practice beyond specific organisational settings.
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